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 The franchisor-franchisee relationship is unique in that it has characteristics of 
both an arm’s length business transaction as well as an ongoing business relationship.  As 
time goes by, however, the interests of the parties may diverge.  It is in the franchisees’ 
interest to make their individual units as profitable as possible while, conversely, franchi-
sors also profit from the licensing of the trademark and the collection of royalties from all 
their franchisees.  For example, an increase in the number of stores in a given market will 
likely benefit the franchisor, whereas the same expansion may dilute the profitability of a 
particular franchisee through encroachment.  The parties’ interests, thus, become misa-
ligned.   
We argue that that, in addition to increased disclosure under Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) rules, the misalignments in the franchisor-franchisee relationship can 
be addressed by taking a more self-regulatory approach that recasts the duties owed 
among the parties.  The FTC regulations focus on greater disclosure and as government 
regulations the rules are aimed at external incentives and protecting of the party that is 
perceived as having less leverage and (i.e., the franchisee).  We argue for a more fiduci-
ary duty-like relationship for franchisor-franchisee relationship and look at two somewhat 
related ways that the relationship is “self-regulated” by the market and, thus, the parties.  
We first examine the time-tested mechanism of fiduciary duties imposed by the courts as 
an additional balancing mechanism to supplement the mere disclosure under the FTC.  
Second, we examine the equitable standards applied to restrictive covenants, such as non-
compete agreements and non-disclosure (confidentiality) agreements as a further refer-
ence point for how the common law can provide guidance on the boundaries of the fran-
chisor-franchisee relationship.  We conclude that this mix of court intervention to impose 
fiduciary duties and the existing FTC regulation is sensible because the parties are in a 
relatively long-term, well-defined relationship in which the initial disclosure under the 
FTC rules is insufficient. 
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Introduction 
 
The franchisor-franchisee relationship is unique in that it has characteristics of 
both an arm’s length business transaction as well as an ongoing business relationship.  At 
the beginning of the typical franchise relationship, the interests of the franchisor and the 
franchisee are aligned.1  Both franchisor and franchisee are interested in entering new 
markets and increasing profits together in a coordinated effort.2  As time goes by and as 
circumstances change, however, the interests of the parties may diverge.  It is in the fran-
chisee’s interest to make its individual unit as profitable as possible while the franchisor 
also profits from the licensing of the trademark and the collection of royalties from all of 
its franchisees.3  For example, an increase in the number of stores in a given market—or 
perhaps more online sales—will likely benefit the franchisor, whereas the same expan-
sion may dilute the profitability of a particular franchisee.4  The parties’ interests thus be-
come misaligned.5   
In part to address this perceived misalignment, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) promulgated the Amended FTC Rule of 2007 to further formalize a set of required 
                                                          
1 See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 201-02 (2010) (“When a 
franchised business is in the early stages of development, the interests of franchisor and franchisee are 
well aligned; both seek to enter new markets and benefit from a share of the profits. As the markets ma-
ture, however, the interests of franchisors and franchisees may begin to diverge.”).  
2 Id.  
3 Id.  There are several reasons why the franchisor and franchisee’s interests may start to diverge as the 
relationship moves forward after the agreement is struck: 
Franchisors gain the capital needed to open more of their own stores or to sell to 
new franchisees in the most profitable markets.  Moreover, franchisors may decide 
that they no longer need the franchisees and thus attempt to convert stores to corpo-
rate control.  The idea is that a maturing business finds it easier to acquire the re-
sources it needs to expand and therefore will, over time, seek to buy back franchised 
units and grow by creating company-owned units. Thus arises the issue of alleged 
market incursion and supposed cannibalization of the franchisees' sales, a predica-
ment starting in the 1970s and growing increasingly prominent in recent years.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
4 Id. at 204-05.  The antipathy the parties can feel over territorial encroachment can be mutual, for in-
stance:  
When a market reaches the saturation point, the two goals begin to conflict, with 
franchisors making money—a percentage of gross franchise revenue—regardless of 
how profitable the individual franchise was.  Just as franchisees feel wronged by 
franchisor expansion that could reduce the sales at existing units, franchisors often 
battle proposed legislation that they contend unfairly expands franchisee rights and 
restricts franchisor conduct. The differences are exacerbated when franchisors do 
not see saturated markets but eye territories with growing populations and, in some 
instances, franchisees who even sell competing products. 
Id. 
5 This observation is consistent with the notion that franchise contracts are a prime example of incom-
plete contracts, where issues often arise that are unforeseeable at the time the contract is executed. See 
generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Con-
tracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990). 
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material disclosures from the franchisor, including a prominent warning about the lack of 
territorial exclusivity, if applicable.  Seemingly the FTC’s goal was to use increased dis-
closure as a tool for greater fairness by leveling the information playing field so that pro-
spective franchisees could know more about the relationship.6  The disclosures, however, 
are aimed at the arm’s length nature of the initial decision to form a relationship by con-
tract and fail to provide guidelines for the ongoing relationship.7  This failure to address 
the ongoing, post-sale relationship is not an oversight but a conscious choice by the FTC 
in promulgating the new rule.8  
In contrast, corporate law has found ways to address the potential misalignment 
of corporate actors with the interests of the firm by establishing duties between the par-
ties, via fiduciary duties to the business entity.  The separation of ownership from control 
in the public corporation provides the opportunity for managers to act in their own self-
interest to the detriment of the firm.  This is sometimes called the agency problem.9  The 
common law developed throughout the years to impose fiduciary obligations on the di-
                                                          
6 Moreover, there are costs and benefits associated with any of regulatory interventions in the franchisor-
franchisee relationship.  See Francine LaFontaine & Roger D. Blair, The Evolution of Franchising and 
Franchise Contracts: Evidence from the United States, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 381, 434 (2009) 
(“[It is] difficult to develop appropriate regulatory regimes to address franchisor-franchisee conflict . . . . 
[A] description of these relationships will permit a better assessment of the likely cost and benefit of dif-
ferent types of regulatory interventions across all the different types of industries where franchising ex-
ists, or in the future, may be used.”). 
7 See Keith Girard, Franchising Still Fraught With Pitfalls Despite New F.T.C. Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/allbusiness/09girard.html?ref=smallbusiness (“The FTC also chose to 
concentrate its enforcement efforts on pre-sale franchise disclosure issues, when most of the problems 
encountered by franchisees occur post-sale, according to Susan P. Kezios, president of the American 
Franchisee Association, a Chicago-based group that solely represents franchisees.”). 
8 The FTC’s comments in support of the final rule makes clear that, despite calls from some franchisee 
advocates to regulate the post-agreement relationship, the FTC did not do so under a justification that 
there was an insufficient record of Unfair Acts or Practices within the FTC’s mandate.  Disclosure Re-
quirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunities, 72 Fed. Reg. 15444 
(Mar. 30, 2007) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 436-37).  
Specifically, the FTC found that the comments on the proposed rule included “many fran-
chisees and their advocates” who: 
criticized the [proposed Amended] Rule for not going far enough [and] urged the 
Commission to address in this rulemaking a variety of post-sale franchise contract or 
‘‘relationship’’ issues, including prohibiting or limiting the use of post-contract cov-
enants not to compete, encroachment of franchisees’ market territory, and re-
strictions on the sources of products or services.  Indeed, some franchisees asserted 
that if the Rule cannot address post-sale relationship issues, then the Commission 
should abolish the Rule. 
Id. at 15447. 
9 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (articulating an economist’s view of 
agency costs and the opportunist managers’ rent seeking at the expense of shareholders’ financial inter-
ests).  But see generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012) (asserting that the agency cost prob-
lem is wrongly the focus of corporate governance efforts and driven by a myth of shareholder domi-
nance in firm hierarchies as a legal mandate). 
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rectors and officers of the firm to counter the potential misalignment of interests and alle-
viate the harm of potential moral hazards that put managerial interests above those of the 
firm.  These include the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation of good faith, and the 
duty of candor.10 
In this Article, we examine the franchisor-franchisee relationship and highlight 
potential lessons that may be learned from a comparison with corporate governance prin-
ciples.  Ideally, the franchisor-franchisee relationship should be based upon open com-
munication and collaboration.11  Both the franchisee and the franchisor must be willing to 
communicate openly and believe there is a degree of equity in the relationship.12  Perhaps 
duties analogous to those imposed in the realm of corporate law may facilitate develop-
ment of legal principles, which could support the relationship beyond mere disclosure.   
Further, we argue that in addition to increased disclosure under the Amended 
Rule, the misalignments in the franchisor-franchisee relationship can be addressed by tak-
ing a more self-regulatory approach that recasts the duties owed among the parties.  The 
FTC regulations focus on greater disclosure and, as government regulations, are aimed at 
external incentives and protecting the party that is perceived as having less leverage and 
expertise (i.e., the franchisee).  In arguing for a more fiduciary duty-like relationship for 
the franchisor-franchisee relationship, we look at two somewhat related ways that the re-
lationship is “self-regulated” by the market and, thus, by the parties.   
In addition, we examine the equitable standards applied to restrictive covenants, 
specifically non-compete agreements, as a further reference point for how the common 
law can provide guidance on the boundaries of the franchisor-franchisee relationship.  
We conclude that a mix of court intervention to impose fiduciary duties and the existing 
FTC regulations is sensible because the parties are in a relatively long-term, well-defined 
relationship in which the initial disclosure under the FTC rules is insufficient. 
 
I. The Misalignment Problem:  The FTC Approach to Encroachment 
 
To begin, we first look at the main misalignment in the franchise relationship:  
encroachment.13  Essentially, encroachment is “the phenomena where the franchisor has 
authorized a new franchise or established a company-owned unit within an existing fran-
chisee’s market area.”14  Professor Robert Emerson describes encroachment as a perenni-
                                                          
10 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER M. FORRESTER & CELESTE S. FERBER, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND OTHER 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 10 (5th ed. 2012). 
11 David Meretta & Eric Karp, Regulation FD: Roadmap to Better Relations Between Franchisors and 
Franchisees, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 117, 117 (2007).  
12 Id.  
13 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 1. 
14 Id. at 193.  While territorial encroachment is the principle encroachment issue and the focus here, oth-
er forms of encroachment, including product or service encroachment and trademark encroachment, also 
exist.  William Slater Vincent, Encroachment: Legal Restrictions on Retail Franchise Expansion, 13 J. 
BUS. VENTURING 29, 30 (1998). 
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al issue for franchisees that “remains in particular for numerous franchised systems as a 
whole, the issue most in need of a just resolution.”15  Classically, encroachment arises 
when, post-contract, the franchisor, either directly or through a new franchisee, sets up 
business in the same geographic territory as another franchisee, resulting in competition 
between the two franchisees to the harm of the earlier franchisee (so-called cannibaliza-
tion or market incursions).16  Growing concerns include nontraditional encroachment17 
and software and internet sales,18 which are part of the impetus for the FTC’s final 
Amended Rule and push for greater pre-sale disclosure.   
At the heart of the encroachment issue are the seemingly conflicting interests be-
tween the franchisor and franchisee.  The overarching aim for a franchisor is “to maxim-
ize market penetration” in order to increase awareness of its brand, maximize its revenue 
base, increase operations, and maximize market saturation in a particular region.19  Thus, 
a franchisor has a legitimate business interest in expansion, which will often include the 
need for additional production within particular geographic areas.20  A franchisee, mean-
while, has a legitimate business interest operating in a particular geographic area without 
competition and will thus have concerns if a franchisor attempts to encroach within its 
territory.21  This expansion by a franchisor may have a negative impact on a particular 
franchisee, even though it benefits the franchise as a whole.22  Franchisor encroachment 
could negatively impact the bottom line of a particular franchisee, reducing sales and 
profitability.23 
When a franchisee asserts a legal claim of encroachment by a franchisor, the 
most common legal theory advanced by the franchisee is breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith.24  The implied covenant of good faith holds that there is an implied cove-
nant in every contract that neither party will do anything to destroy or injure the right of 
the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.25  This definition has been expanded 
by the courts over the years, such that the implied covenant of good faith now prohibits 
one party from taking advantage of gaps or ambiguities in a contract to the detriment of 
                                                          
15 Emerson, supra note 1, at 193-94 (emphasis in original). 
16 Id. at 236-37 (noting that territorial clause interpretation has been difficult for courts and that “con-
tractual” ambiguities have led to many courts interpreting differing versions “of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing”). 
17 Id. at 214-20. 
18 Id. at 223-28. 
19 Ronald R. Fieldstone, Franchise Encroachment Law, 17 FRANCHISE L.J. 75, 75 (1998). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 75-76. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 76. 
24 Vincent, supra note 14, at 31. 
25 Id. (citing Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933)); see also 
Frank J. Cavico, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Franchise Business Relationship, 
6 BARRY L. REV. 61 (2006). 
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the other.26  In addition, in the United States, the imposition of good faith is enshrined in 
the Uniform Commercial Code.27 
Yet, although the implied covenant of good faith can work to protect a vulnera-
ble party when contractual terms are ambiguous, its scope is limited in the franchise con-
text.  Generally, for franchise encroachment issues, the contractual language in the fran-
chise agreement governs.28  Thus, although the implied covenant of good faith “protects 
the reasonable expectations of parties involved in a contractual relationship,” its scope is 
limited because the contractual language of the franchise agreement or other agreements 
made by the parties always supersedes it.29  Consequently, the covenant of good faith will 
not override the express contractual terms of the franchise agreement, and franchisors are 
free to incorporate contractual terms that, in their absence, would violate the covenant of 
good faith.30  For example, in Chang v. McDonald’s Corp. the court found that the fran-
chisor did not breach the franchise agreement by opening new units within four miles of 
the franchisee’s unit because the agreement expressly precluded the franchisee from ex-
clusivity or territorial rights.31  Furthermore, due to this express and unambiguous con-
tractual language, there could be no violation of the implied covenant of good faith.32   
If, however, the contractual terms in a franchise agreement surrounding the fran-
chisor’s ability to locate new franchises are vague, the implied covenant of good faith is 
given greater weight and the reasonableness of the franchisor’s actions are considered.33  
The rub is deciding what is considered vague or ambiguous language—an interpretation 
that has caused seemingly inconsistent results across cases.  A problem also arises when 
                                                          
26 Cavico, supra. 64-5 quoting Kirke LaShelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 NY 79, 87 (N.Y. 
1933)(“…the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] means that neither party to the agreement 
‘…shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to 
receive the fruits of the contract.’”); see also Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. 
River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d. 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992); James v. Whirlpool Corp., 806 F. Supp. 
835, 843 (E.D Mo. 1992). 
27 See, e.g., Andrew Terry & Cary Di Lernia, Franchising and the Quest for the Holy Grail: Good Faith 
or Good Intentions?, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 542, 543 (2009) (quoting U.C.C. §1-304 [(year)] on good 
faith in covered contracts).  As Terry and De Lernia point out, “Despite its long heritage in the US, the 
scope of the implied covenant of good faith remains elusive.”  Id. at 556.   
28 Fieldstone, supra note 19, at 75. 
29 Id. at 76; Vincent, supra note 14, at 31. 
30 Id. 
31 Vincent, supra note 14, at 32 (citing Chang v. McDonald’s Corp., C.A. No. 95-16012, 1996 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 33288 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 1996)). 
32 But see Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding that a franchi-
sor did not have a right to place other units in the area surrounding the franchisee unless the right was 
expressly retained in the contract). 
33 Id.; see, also, Photovest v. Format Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 728 (7th Cir. 1979).  In this case the court 
found that, in a franchisee agreement that failed to provide the franchisee with an exclusive territory and 
did not expressly allow the franchisor to locate new units at any location nears a franchisee, a franchisor 
breached the implied covenant of good faith when it encroached on a franchisee’s location because the 
franchisor had represented, prior to executing the agreement, that the franchisee would be free from en-
croachment in a two mile radius, the encroachment would preclude profitable operation of the franchi-
see, and the franchisor was attempting to coerce the franchisee to terminate the franchise agreement.  Id. 
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the contractual language is silent on a particular issue.  For example, in Scheck v. Burger 
King Corp., a franchise agreement expressly denied the franchisee “any area, market, or 
territorial rights”, but did not expressly grant the franchisor unrestrained discretion in 
opening new units.34  Rather than finding that this express language allowed the franchi-
sor to open additional units near the franchisee, like the court found in Chang, the Scheck 
court found that the rights granted to Burger King were vague because the franchise 
agreement did not expressly allow Burger King unrestrained expansion.35  As such, the 
court applied the implied covenant of good faith and denied summary judgment for the 
franchisor, reasoning that the franchisee expected that the franchisor would not “act to 
destroy the right of the franchisee to enjoy the fruits of the contract.”36  Although Scheck 
has been criticized and rejected by many courts, the circuits are split on recognizing its 
validity.37  Thus, because the focus is on the specific contractual language and there is no 
uniform guidance as to the interpretation of the contractual language, case law on the is-
sue has been inconsistent and case specific38 or varied by state.39  There are “substantial 
gaps” regarding when contractual silence should implicate the implied covenant of good 
faith.40   
Rather than address the issue of good faith, however, the Amended Rule is 
aimed, in part, at addressing the encroachment issue through increased disclosure related 
to the start of the franchisor-franchisee relationship at the time the franchise agreement is 
signed.  This rule is addressed below. 
A.  Franchise Disclosure Requirements 
 
The FTC passed the Amended Rule on January 22, 2007.41  The Amended Rule 
increases the material disclosures that franchisors must make to potential franchisees pri-
or to the start of any contractual relationship.   
 
 
                                                          
34 Scheck, 756 F. Supp. at 549. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. The court also noted that the franchisor could have been granted summary judgment if the agree-
ment expressly reserved in the franchisor the right to unrestrained expansion.  Id.; see also Emerson, 
supra note 1. 
37 Robert Zarco & Lawrence Ashe, The Sounds of Silence in the Franchise Agreement, 19 FRANCHISE 
L.J. 1, 25 (1999).   
38 Susan Grueneberg & Jonathan Solish, Franchising 101, 19 BUS. L. TODAY 11, 14 (2010). 
39 For example, some states impose an implied covenant of good faith on many contracts.  See, e.g., 
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1432 (2014) (Minnesota’s imposition of the implied cove-
nant of good faith in  an airline frequent flier rewards program was preempted by federal law.). 
40 Zarco & Ashe, supra note 37. 
41 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1-11 (2014); see also Kevin J. Moran & Max Schott, II, The Amended FTC Fran-
chise Rule: Much Ado About Nothing?, 10 FRANCHISE LAW. 3, 3 (2007).  The franchisors could choose 
to comply with the Amended Rule on July 1, 2007 but were required to have come under compliance by 
July 1, 2008.  Id. 
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In particular, the FTC’s Amended Rule requires material disclosures in five cat-
egories: 
 
(1) the nature of the franchisor and the franchise system; 
(2) the franchisor’s financial viability; 
(3) the costs involved in purchasing and operating a franchised outlet; 
(4) the terms and conditions that govern the franchise relationship; and 
(5) the names and addresses of current franchisees, who can share their 
experiences within the franchise system.42  
 
The Amended Rule covers retail franchises, product/package franchises, and 
franchises granted to wholesalers and to manufacturers.43  The nature of the relationship 
is analyzed when determining whether this franchise rule applies.  The relevant consider-
ation is not how the parties characterize the relationship but how the relationship oper-
ates.44  In addition, the Amended Rule focuses solely on franchise sales.  This is a change 
from the original Rule, which also encompassed business opportunity ventures.45  Fur-
thermore, compliance with the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) guidelines 
under state law is no longer sufficient for compliance with the Amended Rule.46  Prior to 
the adoption of the Amended Rule, the UFOC guidelines had effectively been the nation-
al franchise disclosure standard.47 
 
B.  Major Reforms Under the Amended Rule 
 
There are a number of major reforms that were promulgated under the Amended 
Rule.  Some of the major revisions include:  
 
1. Usage of E-Disclosure: Franchisors have the option of providing the disclo-
sure document in hard copy or electronically, including through e-mail or 
via a web-based download.48  However, the franchisor has the duty to advise 
the franchisee of the different formats that are available to it, and the fran-
                                                          
42 The Franchise Rule: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 8-9  (2002) (statement of J. Howard Beasley, Director, 
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection) [hereinafter The Franchise Rule].  
43 HAROLD BROWN ET AL., FRANCHISING: REALITIES AND REMEDIES § 6.04 (2d. ed. 2012). 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunities, 71 
Fed. Reg. 15444 (Mar. 30, 2007) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 436-37). 
48 FTC Franchise Rule Summary, INT’L FRANCHISE ASS’N, 
http://www.franchise.org/uploadedFiles/Franchise_Industry/Government_Relations/Intl,_Fed,_State_Iss
ues/FTC%20Franchise%20Rule%20Memo%200207.pdf {last visited May 22, 2014).  
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chisee must have the ability to store and print the version that the franchisor 
provides.   
2. Eliminates the First Personal Meeting Rule:  The previous FTC rule required 
a personal first meeting, at which, a franchisor (or its agent) was required to 
provide a Disclosure Document to the potential franchisee.49  
3. Final Agreement Delivery Rule: The previous "five business day" require-
ment under the old FTC rule has been eliminated in the amended version. 
Under the old FTC rule, the franchisor and the broker were required to pro-
vide prospective franchisees with a copy of the final franchise and related 
agreements at least five business days before the date of execution of the 
agreement.50  Under the Amended Rule, the agreement form that is attached 
to the disclosure document serves as the final delivered agreement.  If the 
franchisor chooses to make unilateral changes to the agreement, then it must 
deliver this final edited version to the franchisee seven days prior to sign-
ing.51 
4. Franchisor-initiated Litigation: Under the original Rule, only claims or coun-
terclaims by franchisees had to be disclosed.  Now, in addition, franchisor-
initiated litigation against franchisees must be disclosed.  “The FTC allows 
summary disclosure of such litigation arising in the prior year and mandates 
updating of such disclosures only on an annual basis rather than quarterly.”52 
5. Disclosure of Technology: “Franchisors may provide summary disclosure 
about computers and technology requirements rather than the detailed dis-
closure required under the UFOC.”53  
6. Limited Parent Company Disclosures: Parent company disclosures have 
been significantly reduced from the original Rule drafts.  The parent must be 
identified in Item 1 and any bankruptcy information must be disclosed in 
Item 4.  Otherwise, parent disclosures are required if the parent guarantees 
the performance of the franchisor or undertakes to provide post-sale ser-
vices.54  
7. Required Disclosures of Franchisor: Item 12 mandates that “[i]f the franchi-
sor does not provide any protected territory, the disclosure document must 
contain a warning legend about the franchisee's lack of exclusivity and the 
possibility of competition from other channels of distribution.”55  “The dis-
                                                          
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Item 12 of the FTC Rule concerning territorial exclusivity now goes as far as providing disclosure 
language related to a lack of exclusivity, as follows: “You will not receive an exclusive territory. You 
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closure document must contain a description of the franchisor’s renewal pol-
icy and whether renewal entails a requirement that the franchisee execute a 
new, and possibly different, franchise agreement.”56  “The new disclosure 
document mandates a fully reconciled tabular summary of the inflow and 
outflow of franchised and company-owned outlets over the course of each 
year.  It also establishes a separate table for transfers, which ultimately do 
not affect the total number of operating outlets.”57  
 
Notably, these rules provide the minimum disclosure requirements.  States can 
choose to implement more stringent regulations regarding required disclosures between 
franchisees and franchisors.58  The Amended Rule, however, is not without its detractors.  
The next Section addresses these critiques. 
C.  Critiques of the Amended Rule 
 
The Amended Rule has been criticized as “much ado about nothing.”59  Critics 
find that the Amended Rule does nothing to expand the original FTC Rule promulgated 
in 197860 and provides no significant impact on American franchise law.  The Amended 
Rule focuses on providing material disclosures prior to the entering into of a franchising 
contract, rather than imposing any additional federal oversight into the process.61  There 
is also no indication of movement toward a direct governance system over the entirety of 
the relationship between franchisor and franchisee.62  
Furthermore, the Amended Rule does not address the substance of the relation-
ship between franchisors and franchisees.  The FTC apparently presumes that as long as 
potential franchisees are provided with full and complete disclosure regarding material 
information, the market will naturally take care of the rest.63  Yet, the franchise relation-
ship may remain inherently unfair with the franchisor retaining the ability to dictate the 
terms upon which the franchisee is allowed to conduct business.64    
                                                          
may face competition from other franchisees, from outlets that we own, or from other channels of distri-
bution or competitive brands that we control.”  See FTC, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR FRANCHISE RULE 16 
C.F.R. PART 436, at 73 (2008). 
56 FTC Franchise Rule Summary, supra note 48. 
57 Id. 
53 Moran & Schott, supra note 41.   
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 See generally The Franchise Rule, supra note 42. 
64 See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT., DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND PROHIBITIONS CONCERNING 
FRANCHISING: STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PROPOSED REVISED TRADE 
REGULATION RULE 42 (2004).  
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Moreover, as noted by Professor Emerson, the Amended Rule does nothing to 
address the lack of incentives for the franchisor to put much effort into the ongoing rela-
tionship.65  Similarly, Professors Lafontaine and Shaw found that “with a franchisee, the 
franchisor benefits from the dedication and drive of an individual who is building a busi-
ness for himself.  And this motivation and drive of the individual franchisee, as compared 
to the typical company manager, is a main reason why franchisors use franchising to 
begin with.”66    
Thus, the state of affairs with respect to franchise encroachment is one where the 
FTC’s Amended Rule focuses on increased disclosure as a way of informing a long-term 
contractual relationship that, in the best case, should lead to collaboration for the mutual 
financial benefit of both parties.  The FTC, however, implicitly abdicates the responsibil-
ity to improve the often-fraught post-sale relationship of the parties that forms the bulk of 
the time during which the parties are bound to cooperate for their financial benefit.   
As noted above, corporate governance and restrictive covenants legal concepts 
and approaches may provide insights for courts and state legislatures intent on curbing 
encroachment abuse and promoting alignment among the parties to a franchise agree-
ment.  Part II provides an overview of the fiduciary duties imposed by the corporate law 
to address the potential misalignment resulting from the separation of ownership from 
control of firms, followed, in Part III, by an analysis of the ways in which the law of re-
strictive covenants may be instructive in addressing the shortcomings of franchise law. 
  
II. Corporate Law Fiduciary Duties:  An Overview 
 
An often-discussed misalignment of several parties’ interests in the corporate 
law context arises when the interests of managers and owners (i.e., shareholders) diverge.  
Throughout the modern history of corporate law, courts and legislatures have imposed 
fiduciary duties on the directors and officers of the firm as a way to address this prob-
lem.67  The corporate law fiduciary duties may provide a starting point for envisioning 
the franchisor-franchisee relationship as a relationship that could be governed by similar 
duties, instead of simply by the bounds of contract law.68   
                                                          
65 See Emerson, supra note 1. 
66 Roger Blair & Francine LaFontaine, Understanding the Economics of Franchising and the Laws that 
Regulate It, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 55, 62 (2007).  Potential solutions have been put forth to deal with the 
moral hazard issue.  Some have included avoiding passing strict legislation governing encroachment and 
the potential losses that occur with this, having regular audits to determine any losses from encroach-
ments, and/or employing a “facts and circumstances” test.  See Emerson, supra note 1, at 257. 
67 See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc’y Bancorp, 678 A.2d 533, 539 (Del. 1996) (“Fiduciary duties are owed by the 
directors and officers to the corporation and its stockholders.”).  
68 The common law of fiduciary duties has had a difficult time taking root in the courts, in part because 
of the language inserted into agreements, where “most franchise contracts stipulate that the parties have 
‘no special relationship’ and are ‘dealing at arm's length,’ and such clauses have helped to persuade 
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Simultaneously with the focus on increased disclosure at the point of the sale 
with a formal Franchise Disclosure Document, some prominent franchise law practition-
ers have also begun calling for more fiduciary-like treatment of the franchisor-franchisee 
relationship.69  Specifically, these advocates argue for the courts to impose more good 
faith and fair dealing duties.70   
The most basic and essential of the fiduciary duties are the duties of care and 
loyalty.71  Fiduciary duties also include the obligation to act in good faith and the duty of 
candor.  The Delaware courts consider the duty of good faith and fair dealing as a subset 
of the duty of loyalty.72  For our purposes, we will consider the duties owed by corporate 
directors and officers: the duties of care and loyalty, as well as the obligation of good 
faith and the duty of candor, embodied within that duty of loyalty. 
Pursuant to the duty of care, directors and officers must, when making any deci-
sion on behalf of the firm, act as reasonably prudent persons in their positions would 
act.73  This standard imposes the obligation of directors and officers to be fully informed 
and to carefully deliberate when making decisions.74  In determining whether the stand-
ard is met, courts look to whether the directors or officers fully informed themselves of 
                                                          
some courts that there was no fiduciary relationship.”  Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol 
Evidence Rule, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 659, 678 (2013). 
69 See Janet Sparks, ABA Legal Wizard Abrams Asks for Good Faith in Franchise Law Reform, BLUE 
MAUMAU (Jan. 3, 2014), 
http://www.bluemaumau.org/13438/aba_legal_wizard_abrams_asks_good_faith_franchise_law_reform 
(discussing comments from the former head of the ABA Franchise Law divisions calling for more court 
imposition of good faith and fair dealing duties, as well as a private right of action, to obviate contractu-
al overreaching by franchisors). 
70 Id. Other suggested approaches to addressing the encroachment problem come from enacting anti-
encroachment legislation at the state level or treating franchisees as employees.  Emerson, supra note 1, 
at 281-89.  Legislation addressing encroachment often sputters in state houses in part due to franchisor 
resistance to regulation but could be useful as a way to “introduce greater certainty to the law of en-
croachment, legislation could be a distinct improvement.”  Id. at 256. 
71 See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d. Cir. 1984) (“A board member's 
obligation to a corporation and its shareholders has two prongs, generally characterized as the duty of 
care and the duty of loyalty.”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Verestar, Inc. v. Am. Tower 
Corp. (In re Verestar, Inc.), 343 B.R. 444, 472 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The fiduciary duties of direc-
tors ordinarily include the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.”). 
72 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370-71 (Del. 2006) (“…although good faith may be described col-
loquially as part of a “triad” of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation 
to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as 
the duties of care and loyalty.”) See also. In re Verestar, 343 B.R. at 472 (“The failure to act in good 
faith may result in liability because the requirement to act in good faith "is a subsidiary element . . . of 
the fundamental duty of loyalty.”). 
73 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The fiduciary 
duty of due care requires that directors of a Delaware corporation ‘use that amount of care which ordi-
narily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances’. . . .”).   
74 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (finding that, in the context of mergers, the 
duty of care included the duty “to act in an informed and deliberate manner . . . .”). 
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all reasonably available, material information relating to the decision.75  A firm’s direc-
tors or officers must consider both procedural issues (i.e., the completeness of the infor-
mation, the time taken to review the information, and the opportunity to consult with ex-
perts about the information) and substantive issues (i.e., whether the decisions made are 
consistent with expert advice and are reasonable given the circumstances and alterna-
tives).76   
Pursuant to the duty of loyalty, directors and officers must act in the best inter-
ests of the corporation when making corporate decisions.77  Although the duty of loyalty 
is not breached when a director or officer profits from a decision that also profits the cor-
poration, it requires that directors and officers, when evaluating such decisions, put the 
corporation’s interests above their personal interests.78  Thus, although directors and of-
ficers do not need to be completely disinterested decision makers, the duty of loyalty is 
breached when directors divert corporate opportunities, assets, or information away from 
the corporation for their own personal gain.79  Additionally, included in the duty of loyal-
ty is the corporate opportunity doctrine, under which a director must make a business op-
portunity that is related to the corporation’s business available to the corporation before 
pursuing it for herself.80 
The duty of good faith is also an element of the duty of loyalty.81  To act in good 
faith, directors and officers must “act in the best interests of the corporation and its stock-
holders at all times.”82  A director fails to act in good faith, then, when she does not act in 
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.83  A director who violates good 
faith also violates the duty of loyalty because “bad faith conduct . . . would seem to be 
other than loyal conduct.”84 
In theory, a fairness review should be applied to every alleged breach of a fiduci-
ary duty.  This requirement was set forth in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,85 where the 
court found that all types of breach of fiduciary duty claims were subject to a fairness re-
                                                          
75 DLA PIPER LLP, OVERVIEW OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF MEMBERS OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING DESIGNEES EMPLOYED BY CORPORATE INVESTORS 1-3 (2008), available at 
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=366&Itemid=93. 
76 Id. 
77 See, e g., In re Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 750-51 (recognizing that the duty of loyalty prohibits corpo-
rate officers and directors from using their position to further their private interests).   
78 See, e.g., FORRESTER & FERBER, supra note 10, at 21. 
79 See Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Challenge of Company Stock Transactions for Direc-
tors’ Duties of Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437, 444-57 (2006) (explaining an executive’s duty of 
loyalty to their employer). 
80 Id. 
81 See supra, 911 A.2d at 370 (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent 
fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”). 
82 FORRESTER & FERBER, supra note 10, at 36. 
83 Id. 
84 In re ML/EQ Real Estate P’ship Litig., C.A. No. 15741, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 238, at *15 n.20 (Dec. 
20, 1999). 
85 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). 
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view.86  Yet, the fairness review is typically utilized solely for duty of loyalty cases and 
only those which “rise to the level of self-dealing.”87  Courts allow directors to engage in 
conflicted interest transactions if these transactions are pre-approved either by fully in-
formed directors or shareholders, or if the transactions are later approved by courts.88  
When a transaction has been approved by a fully informed shareholder vote or directors’ 
approval, it is typically found to not rise to the level of a conflicted transaction.89  Most 
states have adopted a safe harbor statute for self-dealing transactions, which effectively 
shields self-interested transactions from later claims of breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty 
when there is disinterested-director or shareholder approval after full disclosure.90  The 
courts will conduct a fairness review, however, if the transaction lacks approval.91  
The fairness review consists of two basic themes:  fair dealing and fair price.92  
When courts evaluate whether a transaction can be categorized as involving fair dealing, 
the courts look to the timing of the transaction, how it was initiated, negotiated, and orga-
nized, and the process for approval of both shareholders and directors.93  The fair price 
review considers the relevant factors that could potentially affect the value of a compa-
ny’s stock.94  Both fair dealing and fair price are evaluated in conjunction, in order to de-
termine whether the transaction was in fact fair.95  This type of fairness evaluation is 
done on a case-by-case basis, weighing the various factors relevant to each individual 
transaction.  If the directors demonstrate the fairness of the transaction, the courts will 
typically not find a breach of fiduciary duty.96 
Finally, the duty of candor, as a subset of the duty of loyalty, requires that direc-
tors and officers disclose all known, material information to the board that relates to a 
board decision and the board’s decision-making process.97  Any disclosure of information 
                                                          
86 Julian Velasco, How many Fiduciary Duties are there in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 
1233 (2010). 
87 Id. at 1242. 
88 Id. at 1241. 
89 Id.  
90 See William Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate Fiduciary 
Law, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1084, 1088 (1993). 
91 See, e.g., Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, C.A. No. 16301,1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237, at *34-35 (Dec. 10, 
1998) (finding that the entire fairness standard is implicated “where a majority of the directors approv-
ing the transaction were interested or where a majority stockholder stands on both sides of the transac-
tion . . . .”).   
92 Velasco, supra note 86, at 1241. 
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361(Del. 1993) (“Under the entire fairness stand-
ard of judicial review, the defendant directors must establish to the court's satisfaction that the transac-
tion was the product of both fair dealing and fair price.”). 
97 FORRESTER & FERBER, supra note 10, at 30. 
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must be truthful, accurate, and complete.98  The duty of disclosure appears to be an obli-
gation of complete candor.99   
Courts have extended the duty of candor to a number of situations.  For example, 
in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corporation, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the direc-
tors of Vickers Energy breached their fiduciary duty of candor when they failed to dis-
close material information to minority shareholders in the context of a tender offer.100  
The minority shareholders of TransOcean, the target company, sued the boards of both 
TransOcean and Vickers Energy.101  Here, the court described the fiduciary duty of 
“complete candor” as “complete frankness . . . [under which c]ompletenesss, not adequa-
cy, is both the norm and the mandate.”102  Courts have utilized this language to identify a 
duty of candor or disclosure in a variety of contexts apart from similar issue patterns as 
those in Lynch.103  Smith v. Van Gorkom furthered this articulation of the duty of candor, 
when the Supreme Court of Delaware imposed a duty of complete candor on corporate 
directors seeking shareholder approval of a merger transaction.104 
In 1992, the Delaware Supreme Court in Stroud v. Grace, re-characterized the 
duty of candor as a fiduciary duty of disclosure.105  In the same year, the Delaware Chan-
cery Court expanded the duty of disclosure in Marhart Inc. v. CalMat Co., holding that 
directors owe a duty to disclose all material information in any public disclosure, regard-
less of whether any shareholder action is sought.106  Then in Pfeffer v. Redstone, the Del-
aware Supreme Court affirmed that the duty of disclosure is not an independent duty but 
part of the duties of loyalty and care.107   
Further, there is a materiality standard employed in Delaware when analyzing 
the duty of candor.  Courts determine whether a fact is material by deciding “if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in decid-
ing how to vote.”108  Under this standard, proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure 
of an omitted fact would have caused a reasonable shareholder to change his vote is not 
required.109  Rather, “there must be a substantial likelihood that, under all the circum-
                                                          
98 Id. 
99 Shannon German, What They Don’t Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate Officers’ Duty of Candor to 
Directors, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 221, 227 (2009).   
100 383 A.3d 278, 279-80 (Del. 1977).  
101 Id. at 278. 
102 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Dis-
closure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1104-12 (1996); see also German, supra note 99.   
103 See Hamermesh, supra note 102.  
104 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985). 
105 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992). 
106 Civ. A. No. 11,820, 1992 WL 82365, at 336 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1992). 
107 965 A.2d 676, 684 (Del. 2009). 
108 Id. at 684 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).  
109 Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 945 (Del. 1985) (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449). 
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stances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of 
the reasonable shareholder.”110 
The duty of candor has sometimes, but infrequently, been analyzed through the 
duty of care lens due to the inherent information asymmetry between the board of direc-
tors and the shareholders.  Directors have significantly more knowledge, or access to 
knowledge, than do common shareholders.111  Shareholders rely upon the greater 
knowledge of the directors when determining how they should vote.112  Here, the direc-
tors’ duty of disclosure in recommending shareholder action should mirror the directors' 
duty of care.  Therefore, the directors are required to exercise due care in both the collec-
tion and the presentation of information to shareholders.113  
Although the courts have held that the franchise contract does not establish a fi-
duciary relationship among the parties, in light of the gaps that exist in the current juris-
prudence governing the franchise relationship, lessons may be gleaned from these corpo-
rate law duties.  Before addressing these lessons, however, the next Part provides an 
analysis of another area of law, that governing restrictive covenants, which may also 
prove helpful in resolving some of the issues related to encroachment in the franchise 
arena. 
 
III. The Reasonable Geographic Scope Analysis 
of Restrictive Covenants 
 
In addition to the corporate governance-related duties discussed in the previous 
Part, legal rules surrounding restrictive covenants is another potentially useful area of law 
to explicate an approach courts might take in evaluating the franchise encroachment is-
sue.  Specifically, the covenant not to compete (also known as a noncompete or CNC) is 
a standard contractual tool, the validity of which may be determined by its geographic 
scope element related to competition.114  Since there has been difficulty in finding a legal 
rule for consistently resolving encroachment issues, the geographic scope element of 
common law noncompete enforcement is one approach courts could borrow as a useful 
analytic tool for interpreting when franchisors overreach, beyond the acceptable duties 
discussed in the previous Part.115  
                                                          
110 Id. 
111 Hamermesh, supra note 102, at 1102. 
112 Id. at 1101. 
113 Id.  
114 The employee noncompetes discussed in this Part are related to a restriction on competition that an 
employee agrees to before or during employment, curtailing otherwise lawful post-employment compe-
tition.  There are also CNCs related to owner’s post-sale activities related to the sale of the goodwill of a 
business.  Both types of CNCs are evaluated with the same balancing test discussed in this Part. 
115 Certainly noncompetes, particularly in the post-employment context, are often criticized as harmful 
to a variety of interests from worker freedom to innovation and economic development generally.  See 
generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, 
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Here we focus on the reasonableness evaluation of geographic restrictions in 
noncompetes, but for context, it is useful to examine the full common law balancing test 
used by most courts.  For example in Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court analogized the contractual relationship of a retiring franchisee’s sale 
of its business interest to the usual employer-employee post-employment CNC relation-
ship.116  The court also took the opportunity to reiterate the standard common law test:  
“Non-Competition Agreements are enforceable only if they are necessary to protect a le-
gitimate business interest, reasonably limited in time and space, and consonant with the 
public interest.”117  Ultimately, the franchisor prevailed in receiving an injunction to stop 
its former franchisee from entering into competing businesses, as had been agreed by the 
parties in the initial franchise agreement.118  
The thrust of the common law CNC test is to strike a balance between allowing 
competition and protecting the “legitimate interests” (also known as protectable interests) 
an employer or business purchaser has sought to preserve by the contract.119  In the case 
of employee post-employment noncompetes, courts hold that a protectable interest must 
be more than just a means to restrict competition.120  However, in the case of the franchi-
sor-franchisee relationship, the restriction of competition through market allocation is at 
the heart of the arrangement and, as such, would seemingly easily qualify as a legitimate 
interest to protect from the franchisor’s perspective.   
The public interest prong of the noncompete balancing test is often neglected or 
ignored as irrelevant to the court’s determination.121  In any event, the public interest in-
quiry seems inapplicable to the franchisor-franchisee encroachment context.  This is be-
cause, by its very nature, an encroachment issue that arises suggests that there is a mar-
ket-need for the franchise service or product that is being addressed; the dispute occurs 
because the specter of increased competition is potentially harming the business interests 
                                                          
AND FREE RIDING (2013) (arguing for legal rules to promote labor mobility, including eliminating non-
competes, as a means to spur innovation and economic development). 
116 815 N.E.2d 572, 577-78 (Mass. 2004) (discussing Massachusetts Supreme Court’s first impression 
ruling on whether a non-compete agreement was enforceable in a franchisee context, where the court 
held in favor of the franchisor). 
117 Id. at 639; see also Aspect Software, Inc. v. Barnett, 787 F. Supp. 2d 118, 125-26 (D. Mass. 2011) 
(applying Massachusetts choice of law and noncompete precedent to preliminarily enjoin a former exec-
utive from working for a competitor in breach of his non-compete agreement). 
118 See Boulanger, 815 N.E.2d  at 582. 
119 See generally Norman D. Bishara, Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility with Legal Protec-
tion for Human Capital Investment: 50 States, Public Policy, and Covenants Not to Compete in an In-
formation Economy, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006). 
120 See, e.g., Aspect Software, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 128 (“Courts will not enforce non-competition agree-
ments meant solely to protect employers from run-of-the-mill business competition[, b]ut the protection 
of trade secrets, other confidential information, and the good will the employer has acquired through 
dealings with his customers constitute legitimate business interests.” (quoting Boulanger, 815 N.E.2d at 
639)). 
121 See Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to Determine Covenant 
Not to Compete Legitimacy, 87 IND. L.J. 979, 992 (2012). 
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of the franchisee.  Yet from the franchise customer or the public’s perspective, the greater 
competition that is inherent with franchise encroachment seems to be a positive market 
development.  This competition presumably means greater access to more, and perhaps 
better, products and services, at lower prices. 
The important aspect of the common law CNC enforcement evaluation as related 
to the encroachment question is the limited time and geographic scope prong, particularly 
the geographic restriction term, which is also a hallmark of franchise encroachment.  
Again, when looking at this important element of a non-compete agreement, a court will 
only allow a geographic restriction that is reasonable in light of the legitimate interest of 
the enforcing party (i.e., the new business owner or the former employer, depending on 
the circumstances).122  Much like how changes in the use of technology and globalization 
in business have complicated the ways in which franchise encroachment occurs in recent 
years,123 the same changes have impacted how the geographic scope of noncompetes has 
been considered.124   
Giving courts the discretion to balance competing interests related to fiduciary 
duties owed to business partners—in this case franchisees—along the lines of the balanc-
ing courts already undertake to evaluate CNCs seems appropriate and even natural.  
Moreover, non-compete agreements, as well as confidentiality agreements, are accepted 
fixtures in many, if not most, franchise agreements (assuming they are allowable in the 
relevant jurisdiction) already.125  This fact makes these clauses and their interpretation 
something that many courts are used to, even as some have pointed out that courts are un-
familiar with the intricacies of the franchisor-franchisee relationship.126  Nonetheless 
courts will treat this sort of competitive restriction arising in a business relationship with 
less suspicion than an employee noncompete because the sale of a business arises out of a 
transactional relationship between parties of more equal bargaining.127 
 
IV. Lessons from Corporate Fiduciary Duties and the CNC 
Reasonableness Analysis 
 
                                                          
122 See, e.g., Boulanger, 815 N.E.2d at 580-81. 
123 See Emerson, supra note 1 (discussing how the rise of online commerce has added a new dimension 
to the encroachment concerns of franchisees). 
124 See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (an early application 
of the noncompete reasonableness test to the restrictive covenants in an online commerce context, in-
cluding a finding that as knowledge becomes more quickly obsolete in an online world that the reasona-
bleness of restrictions must be evaluated accordingly). 
125 See generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against Competition, 80 IOWA L. REV. 
1049 (1995). 
126 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 1. 
127 See, e.g., WordWave, Inc. v. Owens, 19 Mass. L. Rep. 37, 2 (Super. Ct. 2004) (“Courts look ‘less 
critically’ at restrictive covenants arising from the sale of a business because, unlike employers and em-
ployees, buyers and sellers are likely to be similarly-situated, with equal bargaining power and often 
times the benefit of counsel.” (citing Boulanger 815 N.E.2d at 578)). 
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Drawing on the corporate law of fiduciary duties and the noncompete reasona-
bleness analysis discussed above, we propose some lessons that can be applied to the 
franchise law encroachment problem and its inherent geographic concerns.  The first Sec-
tion below discusses how recasting the franchisor-franchisee relationship as one defined 
by the portfolio of fiduciary duties can be advantageous for the parties.  Then, building 
on the first discussion, we discuss in the second Section how viewing the misalignment 
problem of encroachment through a noncompete reasonableness evaluation lens may also 
prove useful for the courts. 
 
A. Some Lessons from Corporate Duties for the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship 
 
Historically, courts have generally held that there is no fiduciary duty relation-
ship between franchisors and franchisees.128  Instead, the relationship is considered an 
arm’s length transaction; thus viewing the relationship as a business, rather than as one 
between fiduciaries.129  In so finding, courts have pointed to the lack of control franchi-
sors have over franchisees and the differing goals between the two.  Essentially, courts 
view the franchisor and its franchisee as separate business entities pursuing their own 
business interests.130  When franchises fail, however, franchisees often allege that the 
franchisor breached a fiduciary duty owed to the franchisee.131  In this situation fran-
chisees,  
 
claim that the franchisor (1) had a duty to disclose information when sell-
ing the franchise opportunity to the franchisee, or (2) had a duty to avoid 
self-dealing during the course of the franchise relationship, or (3) is liable 
to the franchisee for tortious breach of the franchise agreement, or (4) 
may not terminate the franchise relationship except for cause.132   
 
                                                          
128 See, e.g., Zachary D. Schorr, Fading Fiduciary Duties Between Franchisors and Franchisees, 17 
BUS. TORTS J. 13, 13 (2010).   
129 See Picture Lake Campground, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 858, 869 (E.D. Va. 1980) (“A 
franchise relationship is inherently a business relationship, not a fiduciary relationship.”); Anne L. Aus-
tin, Comment, When Does a Franchisor Become a Fiduciary?:  Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar 
Int’l Transp. Corp., 43 Case W. Res. 1151, 1164 (1993).   
130 See Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir. 1998). 
131 For more details, see Emerson, supra note 125 at 1063-63, where Professor Emerson explains that: 
 
In order for a court to find a fiduciary obligation concerning a franchise agreement, it must find each of 
the following characteristics: (1) The franchisee reasonably expects that it is purchasing franchisor ex-
pertise as part of the franchise; (2) the franchisor clearly dominates the franchisee with superior 
knowledge and bargaining power; (3) the contract clause in question is incomplete or otherwise necessi-
tates great flexibility in its enforcement; and (4) absent some external motive, the franchisor and franchi-
see have the same interests. 
132 William L. Killion, Existence of Fiduciary Duty Between Franchisor and Franchisee, 52 A.L.R.5th 
613, § 2 (2013). 
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Despite these claims, in a majority of jurisdictions, courts have found that there 
is no fiduciary duty between a franchisor and franchisee.133  In these jurisdictions, rather 
than finding a fiduciary relationship between a franchisor and franchisee, courts view the 
creation of a franchise as an arm’s length, business transaction between a franchisor and 
franchisee.134 
Although a question of whether a fiduciary duty exists is generally a factual mat-
ter for the jury, courts have found that certain relationships in non-franchise contexts give 
rise to fiduciary duties as a matter of law.  These relationships include the attorney-client 
relationship, principal-agent relationship, trustee-beneficiary relationship, and partnership 
relationship.135  As discussed above, fiduciary relationships are also prevalent in corpo-
rate law.  On a case-by-case basis, courts have also found a fiduciary relationship in in-
stances where the trust and confidence given by one party to another allows for undue in-
fluence.136   
In determining whether a fiduciary relationships exists, courts typically look to 
  
(1) whether the activity of the parties goes beyond operating on their own 
behalf and constitutes acting on behalf of both of them; (2) whether the 
parties have a common interest in profiting from the activities of the oth-
er; (3) whether the parties repose trust and confidence in each other; and 
(4) whether one party has power to control or dominate the other.137   
The level of control of one party over the other, coupled with the trust and confi-
dence reposed, is an especially important consideration and requires more than simply a 
disparity in bargaining power to give rise to a fiduciary relationship.138 It requires that the 
                                                          
133 See also Austin, supra note 129.  This is the view taken in most federal jurisdictions and in at least 
thirty-four states.  Schorr, supra note 128, at 13.  
134  Schorr, supra note 128. 
135 Harold Brown, Franchising – A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REV. 650, 664-65 (1971).   
136 Id. 
137 Id.  Similarly, “[a] claim for breach of fiduciary duty involves three elements: breach by a fiduciary 
of a duty owed to plaintiff; defendant's knowing participation in the breach; and damages.” Franklin 
Park Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 530 Fed. App’x 542, 546 (6th Cir. 2013).  Specifically 
there must be a showing that: 
 
(1) [t]he vulnerability of one party to the other which (2) results in the empowerment 
of the stronger party by the weaker which (3) empowerment has been solicited or 
accepted by the stronger party and (4) prevents the weaker party from effectively 
protecting itself. Generally, where parties deal at arms-length in a commercial trans-
action, no relation of confidence or trust sufficient to find the existence of a fiduci-
ary relationship will arise absent extraordinary circumstances. Nevertheless, a dis-
tributorship agreement may, in some rare instances, create a confidential relationship 
out of which a duty of fiduciary care arises.  
 
Id. at 546-47 (citing Manhattan Motorcars, Inc. v. Automobili Lamborghini, S.p.A., 244 F.R.D. 204, 
214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
138 Killion, supra note132, at 2.   
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confidence and trust that has been reposed from one party to the other gives that party 
“domination and influence” in the relationship.139 
Thus, because the extent of control is an important component of finding a fidu-
ciary relationship, the level of control a franchisor exerts over a franchisee is relevant to a 
fiduciary determination.140  In theory, this analysis would create tension for the franchi-
sor, who may wish to exercise some control over the franchisee and yet  avoid creating a 
fiduciary relationship.  In practice, however, this tension is lessened because most courts 
allow a substantial amount of control to be exercised by a franchisor, without imposing a 
fiduciary duty, even when trust and confidence is reposed by the franchisee to the fran-
chisor.141  Despite generally being a question of fact, many courts have found that a fidu-
ciary duty is not automatically created in an arm’s length business transaction, including 
a franchise agreement, because the parties are considered to be pursuing their own inter-
ests.142  The characterization of a franchise relationship in terms of an arm’s length trans-
action then results in a finding of no fiduciary relationship as a matter of law and thus 
eliminates the need for courts to address the level of control exercised by the franchisor 
over the franchisee.   
That said, some jurisdictions have recognized a fiduciary duty between a fran-
chisor and franchisee.  One much-discussed franchise case concerning fiduciary duties is 
Arnott v. American Oil Co., where a federal district court in South Dakota found that, as a 
matter of law, fiduciary duties were “[i]nherent in a franchise relationship.”143  In so find-
ing, the court recognized that both parties had a common interest, both profited from the 
activities of one another, and the franchisor exercised a great amount of control over the 
franchisee.144  Although most courts have declined to follow Arnott, some courts have 
recognized that a fiduciary duty could arise based on the nature of the relationship.145  
The courts recognizing the possibility of a fiduciary relationship have nonetheless strug-
gled “to define the scope of the duty created by the [franchise] relationship.”146  Due to 
                                                          
139 Emerson, supra note125, at 1063. 
140 Id. 
141 Austin, supra note129, at 1173. 
142 See, e.g., Happy's Pizza Franchise, LLC v. Chi. Partners #78, LLC, No. 13-11910, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 45833, at *54 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 3., 2014) (“With one very narrow exception, that is not alleged 
and does not apply here Michigan does not recognize a claim for breach of an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.” (citing Coyer v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., 701 F.3d 1104, 1108 (6th Cir. 2012))); 
Austin, supra note 129, at 1159; George Bundy Smith & Thomas J. Hall, The Hurdle to Pleading Fidu-
ciary Duty Claims to Arm’s Length Relations, 243 N.Y.L.J. 32, 32 (2010). 
143 Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1979). 
144 Id. at 881-82.  For the control prong, the court considered the control the franchisor held over the op-
erations of the franchisee, including the fact that the franchisor determined the hours of operation for the 
franchisee, hired employees for the franchisee, and conducted inspections of the franchisee.  The court 
also considered the control the franchisor exercised regarding product advertising and pricing.  Id. 
145Austin, supra note129, at 1163-64. 
146 Phillips v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 792 F.2d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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this uncertainty, courts have found it difficult to “apply fiduciary law principles to aspects 
of the franchise relationship traditionally governed by contract law.”147   
The conceptual framework of the franchisor-franchisee relationship currently 
taken by a majority of jurisdictions is, however, limited.  It fails to account for the reality 
that the relationship between a franchisor and franchisee is ongoing, rather than simply an 
arm’s length transaction.  Indeed, because of this ongoing relationship, common themes 
can be drawn between the franchise relationship and the fiduciary relationship.  For ex-
ample, in a franchisor-franchisee relationship, the purpose of the relationship is the for-
mation of a commercial venture, under which “both parties have a common interest and 
profit from the activities of the other.”148 
Interestingly, courts that have rejected the imposition of fiduciary duties in the 
franchise relationship have done so because the relationship involves “two business enti-
ties pursuing their own business interests, which do not always coincide.”149  But courts 
have failed to consider that the misalignment of interests may result from the failure to 
impose fiduciary duties in the first place.  If courts seek to erase, or at least diminish, this 
misalignment of interests, then it would seem appropriate to draw on analogies between 
the fiduciary relationship and the franchise relationship.  In both relationships there are 
elements of control, a common purpose, and mutual profiting.   
The inherent control that is both necessary and present in a franchise relationship 
is analogous to that typically present in a fiduciary relationship.  That is, because there is 
some level of control in all franchise relationships, they are similar to fiduciary relation-
ships, where the control of one party over another gives rise to fiduciary obligations.150  
Indeed, at the core of every franchise relationship “is the contractual control exercised by 
the franchisor over every aspect of the franchisee’s business.”151  Thus, Arnott remains 
instructive in that it found a fiduciary relationship in part because the franchisor set the 
hours the franchisee was to remain open, controlled product advertising and pricing, and 
subjected the franchise to inspections.152   
From this control stems a disparity in the position of the parties, which is why fi-
duciary duties are important in this type of relationship.  In essence, in this type of rela-
tionship “[t]here is a marked, intentional, and constantly emphasized disparity in the posi-
tions of the parties—the franchisor combining the roles of father, teacher, and drill 
sergeant, with the franchisee relegated to those of son, pupil, and buck-private, respec-
                                                          
147 Id. 
150  Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 659, 725 (2013) 
(explaining the relational nature of franchise agreements and quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 294 
A.2d 253, 261 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972). 
149 Id.   
150 Brown, supra note135, at 650.   
151 Id. at 663. 
152  Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 882 (8th Cir. 1979). 
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tively.”153  At all times, the franchisee is essentially “at the mercy of the franchisor.”154  
Fiduciary duties are often imposed when there is this type of ongoing relationship with 
such a distinct power disparity, as they work to mitigate and curb potential abuses that 
can arise due to that power disparity.155  In a franchise relationship, then, fiduciary duties 
may be needed to enable the franchisee to succeed and protect his economic integrity.156  
The obligations of the franchisor in the franchise relationship can be compared to the fi-
duciary obligations owed by officers and directors and the potential gross disparity of 
power held by the directors and officers in their roles in the firm.157   
Additionally, like a fiduciary relationship, the franchise relationship is one ideal-
ly built on trust and confidence.158  Indeed, the franchisee looks to the franchisor for 
guidance throughout the entirety of their relationship.  Thus, the franchisee discloses to 
the franchisor intimate and confidential records, and the franchisor inspects those records 
to provide guidance, teaching, and, at times, discipline.159  Fiduciary obligations are 
common in such arrangements, where “the relationship is so close that confidence is nec-
essarily reposed by the one in the other.”160   
Furthermore, the franchise law duty of material disclosure appears to be relative-
ly similar to the duty of candor that exists in the corporate fiduciary relationship.  The re-
quirement of material disclosure provides a franchisee with information that is essential 
to its decision regarding whether to enter into the franchise relationship.  The required 
disclosure attempts to both address the “serious informational imbalance” and prevent the 
“serious economic harm” that could result to franchisees if the franchisors did not ade-
quately disclose all material information.161  It attempts to establish some level of good 
faith at the onset of the relationship, even if that duty does not continue throughout the 
duration of the relationship.   
                                                          
153 Brown, supra note 135, at 664. 
154 Id. at 665. 
155 See, e.g., Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The common law imposes [a fidu-
ciary] duty when the disparity between the parties in knowledge or power relevant to the performance of 
an undertaking is so vast that is a reasonable inference that had the parties . . . negotiated . . . they would 
have agreed that the agent owed the principal [a] high duty . . . because otherwise the principle would be 
placing himself at the agent’s mercy.”); Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
601, 609 (2003) (“The essence of a fiduciary . . . relationship is that the parties do not deal on equal 
terms, because the person in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confi-
dence is in a superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent party.”); Mitchell v. Reyn-
olds, C.A. No. 1451-VCN, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at *37 (Jan. 7, 2009) (recognizing that fiduciary re-
lationships are often imposed when “parties do not deal on equal terms but on one side there is an 
overmastering influence or on the other weakness . . .”). 
156 Brown, supra note135, at 650. 
157 Id. at 665. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 674. 
161 Id.  
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Finally, encroachment is another area that raises fiduciary-like concerns.  At the 
beginning of any franchise relationship, the interests of the franchisor and the franchisee 
line up with one another.162  Both franchisor and franchisee are typically looking to enter 
new markets and increase their profits.163  As circumstances change, the interests of the 
two may diverge.  On one hand, franchisees may look to make their individual units as 
profitable as possible, while, on the other hand, franchisors profit from the licensing of 
the trademark and the collection of royalties from all their franchisees.164  When the mar-
ket is saturated, the two goals conflict because the franchisors continue to make money 
regardless of the amount of profit to each individual franchise unit.165  Without corporate 
fiduciary duties, each entity is incentivized to act in its self-interest at the expense of the 
business partnership.  This misalignment of interests demonstrates the need for reforming 
the law applicable to the franchise relationship.     
Thus, although a majority of jurisdictions reject the idea of a fiduciary relation-
ship in the franchise context,166 strong analogies between a fiduciary relationship and the 
franchise relationship can be drawn.  Furthermore, even though some courts conceptual-
ize the franchise relationship as an arm’s length, business transaction, pursuant to which 
separate business entities are pursuing separate goals,167 other courts have concluded that 
with a franchise relationship, the parties are bound together for an ongoing period of 
time, during which there is a large power disparity while both parties pursue a largely 
common purpose.168  It thus seems appropriate to cast the franchise relationship as a fi-
duciary one.     
B.  The CNC Reasonableness Evaluation and the Franchise Encroachment Problem 
 
If, as we argue in the previous Section, applying the well-developed law of cor-
porate fiduciary duties to the franchisor-franchisee relationship is an important way to 
address the misalignment of interests that arises post-sale, there remains the issue of how 
to address encroachment.  One approach is to evaluate complaints of encroachment using 
the reasonableness evaluation courts have long applied to the geographic scope element 
of non-compete agreements.  
                                                          
162 Emerson, supra note 1, at 201. 
163 Id.  
164 Id. at 204.  
165 Id.  
166 Austin, supra note129. 
167 See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 348 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(“The near-universal rejection of imposing fiduciary duties in the franchise setting reflects a recognition 
that these obligations are out of place in a relationship involving two business entities pursuing their 
own business interests, which of course do not always coincide.”). 
168 See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding that a fiduciary rela-
tionship is inherent in a franchise relationship because “both parties have a common interest and profit 
from the activities of one another”). 
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The courts have consistently used the reasonableness analysis to balance the par-
ties’ interests and to evaluate whether the geographic restriction in a non-compete agree-
ment is broader than necessary to protect the legitimate interests.169  This approach is an 
attractive way to address franchise encroachment for two reasons.  First, it recognizes 
that the parties have a legitimate, albeit limited, interest to protect, which involves a re-
striction on otherwise unfettered competition in the absence of the agreement.  Second, 
the evaluation works as a check on the overreaching tendency associated with the domi-
nant party in the contractual relationship170 (in this case, the franchisor).  While noncom-
petes have been criticized as being similar to contracts of adhesion that are unfair to em-
ployees lacking sufficient leverage challenge the restrictions,171 franchise agreements 
suffer less from this concern because they arise in the context of a business sale, where 
the franchisee has an array of investment choices. 
As is with the case of applying corporate fiduciary duties to managers, other em-
ployees, and directors, courts in most states are already relatively comfortable with the 
reasonableness test for interpreting the permissible geographic scope of a non-compete 
agreement.  There is also an intuitive fairness adjudication and equitable element to eval-
uating geographic scope that courts already undertake regularly with CNC evaluations,172 
which should translate well to reviewing claims of impermissible franchise encroachment 




In advocating for the application of both fiduciary duties and a geographic rea-
sonableness evaluation to the franchise context, and particularly to encroachment, we 
acknowledge that these suggestions for greater judicial involvement are not meant to 
supplant the existing regulation and disclosure mandated by the FTC.  The Amended 
Rule’s emphasis on disclosure in the initial stages of the relationship, pre-sale, is im-
portant; however, imposing greater and reciprocal duties on the parties will serve to em-
                                                          
169 See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (judging the world-
wide restriction on a former employee’s competition in light of the rapid growth of the globalized online 
sales sector). 
170 See generally Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and Ethics of Re-
strictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 1 (2012). 
171 See, e.g., Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsidera-
tion of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 
1214-15 (2001) (discussing the bargaining power disparity when employers requested a noncompete 
agreement at the start of the employment relationship); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and 
Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 384-85 (2006) (discussing some courts’ skepticism about employee bargaining 
power in the employment relationship). 
172 See generally T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 1, 54 (2005).  
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phasize the post-sale collaboration that is essential to the ongoing success of a particular 
franchise system.  Leaving the parties to negotiate, pre-sale, the parameters of a long-
term business relationship with high switching costs has not worked thus far, and solu-
tions to address the encroachment issue will likely be welcomed by conscientious fran-
chisors and franchisees, and their respective advocates.   
Furthermore, addressing misalignment through a mix of court, imposed fiduciary 
duties, and enforcement of the existing FTC disclosure regulation is sensible because the 
parties are in a relatively long-term, well-defined relationship, in which the initial disclo-
sure under the FTC rules is insufficient.  To date, franchise misalignment and encroach-
ment have been generally relegated to the realm of contract interpretation at the start of 
the relationship.  Our suggestions provide additional options for the courts and policy 
makers to consider in light of the conclusion that merely increasing mandated disclosure 
at the inception of the franchise relationship and relying on a mantra of “franchisee be-
ware” will not address the long-term issues. 
 
 
